

# Week #6 Roundtable Exercises

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*The Purposes of Rhetoric and Neo-Classical Rhetorical Criticism  
Facilitated by Joshua Barron on 17 February 2011 in English 5362 (Zdenek)*

1. Watch Video 1 as *Introit*.
2. Read End of Churchill Speech with Audio Clip.
3. Now Divide and Conquer! Using *whatever* resources are available to you, divide in three heterogenous (you pick the characteristics☺) groups and examine the Churchill speech from the three classical Aristotelian angles.

## Group 1

Context - Describe the rhetorical situation, nature of the audience, etc.

Ethos – Identify authority and personality base

Summarize Churchill's style and delivery

How are you inclined to assess Churchill's effectiveness?

## Group 2

Form - Outline the structure of the message

Logos - Identify the logical forms of argument

Summarize Churchill's style and delivery

How are you inclined to assess Churchill's effectiveness?

### **Group 3**

Pathos – Identify the emotional and values-based appeals

Delivery – Summarize Churchill's style

How are you inclined to assess Churchill's effectiveness?

Can you back your position thoroughly?

### **Notes from Summative Discussion**

# Week #6 Roundtable Artifact

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## **"This Was Their Finest Hour" speech to the House of Commons by Winston Churchill**

Recorded June 18, 1940

1 I spoke the other day of the colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed  
2 to withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at the moment when they knew that the French front was  
3 decisively broken at Sedan and on the Meuse. This delay entailed the loss of fifteen or sixteen French  
4 divisions and threw out of action for the critical period the whole of the British Expeditionary Force. Our  
5 Army and 120,000 French troops were indeed rescued by the British Navy from Dunkirk but only with the  
6 loss of their cannon, vehicles and modern equipment. This loss inevitably took some weeks to repair, and in  
7 the first two of those weeks the battle in France has been lost. When we consider the heroic resistance made  
8 by the French Army against heavy odds in this battle, the enormous losses inflicted upon the enemy and the  
9 evident exhaustion of the enemy, it may well be the thought that these 25 divisions of the best-trained and  
10 best-equipped troops might have turned the scale. However, General Weygand had to fight without them.  
11 Only three British divisions or their equivalent were able to stand in the line with their French comrades.  
12 They have suffered severely, but they have fought well. We sent every man we could to France as fast as we  
13 could re-equip and transport their formations.

14 I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of recrimination. That I judge to be utterly futile and even  
15 harmful. We cannot afford it. I recite them in order to explain why it was we did not have, as we could have  
16 had, between twelve and fourteen British divisions fighting in the line in this great battle instead of only  
17 three. Now I put all this aside. I put it on the shelf, from which the historians, when they have time, will select  
18 their documents to tell their stories. We have to think of the future and not of the past. This also applies in a  
19 small way to our own affairs at home. There are many who would hold an inquest in the House of Commons  
20 on the conduct of the Governments-and of Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during the years which led up to  
21 this catastrophe. They seek to indict those who were responsible for the guidance of our affairs. This also  
22 would be a foolish and pernicious process. There are too many in it. Let each man search his conscience and  
23 search his speeches. I frequently search mine.

24 Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall find that we have  
25 lost the future. Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of any distinctions between Members of the present  
26 Government. It was formed at a moment of crisis in order to unite all the Parties and all sections of opinion. It  
27 has received the almost unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament. Its Members are going to stand  
28 together, and, subject to the authority of the House of Commons, we are going to govern the country and fight  
29 the war. It is absolutely necessary at a time like this that every Minister who tries each day to do his duty shall  
30 be respected; and their subordinates must know that their chiefs are not threatened men, men who are here  
31 today and gone tomorrow, but that their directions must be punctually and faithfully obeyed. Without this  
32 concentrated power we cannot face what lies before us. I should not think it would be very advantageous for  
33 the House to prolong this Debate this afternoon under conditions of public stress. Many facts are not clear  
34 that will be clear in a short time. We are to have a secret Session on Thursday, and I should think that would  
35 be a better opportunity for the many earnest expressions of opinion which Members will desire to make and  
36 for the House to discuss vital matters without having everything read the next morning by our dangerous  
37 foes.

38 The disastrous military events which have happened in France during the past fortnight have not come to me  
39 with any sense of surprise. Indeed, I indicated a fortnight ago as clearly as I could to the House that the worst  
40 possibilities were open; and I made it perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France would make no  
41 difference to the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight on, if necessary for years, if necessary  
42 alone." During the last few days we have successfully brought off the great majority of the troops we had on

43 the line of communication in France; and seven-eighths of the troops we have sent to France since the  
44 beginning of the war-that is to say, about 350,000 out of 400,000 men-are safely back in this country. Others  
45 are still fighting with the French, and fighting with considerable success in their local encounters against the  
46 enemy. We have also brought back a great mass of stores, rifles and munitions of all kinds which had been  
47 accumulated in France during the last nine months.

48 We have, therefore, in this Island today a very large and powerful military force. This force comprises all our  
49 best-trained and our finest troops, including scores of thousands of those who have already measured their  
50 quality against the Germans and found themselves at no disadvantage.

51 We have under arms at the present time in this Island over a million and a quarter men. Behind these we have  
52 the Local Defense Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a portion of whom, however, are yet armed with  
53 rifles or other firearms. We have incorporated into our Defense Forces every man for whom we have a  
54 weapon. We expect very large additions to our weapons in the near future, and in preparation for this we  
55 intend forthwith to call up, drill and train further large numbers. Those who are not called up, or else are  
56 employed during the vast business of munitions production in all its branches-and their ramifications are  
57 innumerable-will serve their country best by remaining at their ordinary work until they receive their  
58 summons. We have also over here Dominion armies. The Canadians had actually landed in France, but have  
59 now been safely withdrawn, much disappointed, but in perfect order, with all their artillery and equipment.  
60 And these very high-class forces from the Dominions will now take part in the defense of the Mother Country.

61 Lest the account which I have given of these large forces should raise the question: Why did they not take part  
62 in the great battle in France? I must make it clear that, apart from the divisions training and organizing at  
63 home, only 12 divisions were equipped to fight upon a scale which justified their being sent abroad. And this  
64 was fully up to the number which the French had been led to expect would be available in France at the ninth  
65 month of the war. The rest of our forces at home have a fighting value for home defense which will, of course,  
66 steadily increase every week that passes. Thus, the invasion of Great Britain would at this time require the  
67 transportation across the sea of hostile armies on a very large scale, and after they had been so transported  
68 they would have to be continually maintained with all the masses of munitions and supplies which are  
69 required for continuous battle-as continuous battle it will surely be.

70 Here is where we come to the Navy-and after all, we have a Navy. Some people seem to forget that we have a  
71 Navy. We must remind them. For the last thirty years I have been concerned in discussions about the  
72 possibilities of oversea invasion, and I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at the beginning of  
73 the last war, of allowing all regular troops to be sent out of the country. That was a very serious step to take,  
74 because our Territorials had only just been called up and were quite untrained. Therefore, this Island was for  
75 several months particularly denuded of fighting troops. The Admiralty had confidence at that time in their  
76 ability to prevent a mass invasion even though at that time the Germans had a magnificent battle fleet in the  
77 proportion of 10 to 16, even though they were capable of fighting a general engagement every day and any  
78 day, whereas now they have only a couple of heavy ships worth speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the  
79 Gneisenau. We are also told that the Italian Navy is to come out and gain sea superiority in these waters. If  
80 they seriously intend it, I shall only say that we shall be delighted to offer Signor Mussolini a free and  
81 safeguarded passage through the Strait of Gibraltar in order that he may play the part to which he aspires.  
82 There is a general curiosity in the British Fleet to find out whether the Italians are up to the level they were at  
83 in the last war or whether they have fallen off at all.

84 Therefore, it seems to me that as far as sea-borne invasion on a great scale is concerned, we are far more  
85 capable of meeting it today than we were at many periods in the last war and during the early months of this  
86 war, before our other troops were trained, and while the B.E.F. had proceeded abroad. Now, the Navy have  
87 never pretended to be able to prevent raids by bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men flung suddenly across and  
88 thrown ashore at several points on the coast some dark night or foggy morning. The efficacy of sea power,  
89 especially under modern conditions, depends upon the invading force being of large size; It has to be of large  
90 size, in view of our military strength, to be of any use. If it is of large size, then the Navy have something they  
91 can find and meet and, as it were, bite on. Now, we must remember that even five divisions, however lightly  
92 equipped, would require 200 to 250 ships, and with modern air reconnaissance and photography it would not

93 be easy to collect such an armada, marshal it, and conduct it across the sea without any powerful naval forces  
94 to escort it; and there would be very great possibilities, to put it mildly, that this armada would be intercepted  
95 long before it reached the coast, and all the men drowned in the sea or, at the worst blown to pieces with their  
96 equipment while they were trying to land. We also have a great system of minefields, recently strongly  
97 reinforced, through which we alone know the channels. If the enemy tries to sweep passages through these  
98 minefields, it will be the task of the Navy to destroy the mine-sweepers and any other forces employed to  
99 protect them. There should be no difficulty in this, owing to our great superiority at sea.

100 Those are the regular, well-tested, well-proved arguments on which we have relied during many years in  
101 peace and war. But the question is whether there are any new methods by which those solid assurances can  
102 be circumvented. Odd as it may seem, some attention has been given to this by the Admiralty, whose prime  
103 duty and responsibility is to destroy any large sea-borne expedition before it reaches, or at the moment when  
104 it reaches, these shores. It would not be a good thing for me to go into details of this. It might suggest ideas to  
105 other people which they have not thought of, and they would not be likely to give us any of their ideas in  
106 exchange. All I will say is that untiring vigilance and mind-searching must be devoted to the subject, because  
107 the enemy is crafty and cunning and full of novel treacheries and stratagems. The House may be assured that  
108 the utmost ingenuity is being displayed and imagination is being evoked from large numbers of competent  
109 officers, well-trained in tactics and thoroughly up to date, to measure and counterwork novel possibilities.  
110 Untiring vigilance and untiring searching of the mind is being, and must be, devoted to the subject, because,  
111 remember, the enemy is crafty and there is no dirty trick he will not do.

112 Some people will ask why, then, was it that the British Navy was not able to prevent the movement of a large  
113 army from Germany into Norway across the Skagerrak? But the conditions in the Channel and in the North  
114 Sea are in no way like those which prevail in the Skagerrak. In the Skagerrak, because of the distance, we  
115 could give no air support to our surface ships, and consequently, lying as we did close to the enemy's main air  
116 power, we were compelled to use only our submarines. We could not enforce the decisive blockade or  
117 interruption which is possible from surface vessels. Our submarines took a heavy toll but could not, by  
118 themselves, prevent the invasion of Norway. In the Channel and in the North Sea, on the other hand, our  
119 superior naval surface forces, aided by our submarines, will operate with close and effective air assistance.

120 This brings me, naturally, to the great question of invasion from the air, and of the impending struggle  
121 between the British and German Air Forces. It seems quite clear that no invasion on a scale beyond the  
122 capacity of our land forces to crush speedily is likely to take place from the air until our Air Force has been  
123 definitely overpowered. In the meantime, there may be raids by parachute troops and attempted descents of  
124 airborne soldiers. We should be able to give those gentry a warm reception both in the air and on the ground,  
125 if they reach it in any condition to continue the dispute. But the great question is: Can we break Hitler's air  
126 weapon? Now, of course, it is a very great pity that we have not got an Air Force at least equal to that of the  
127 most powerful enemy within striking distance of these shores. But we have a very powerful Air Force which  
128 has proved itself far superior in quality, both in men and in many types of machine, to what we have met so  
129 far in the numerous and fierce air battles which have been fought with the Germans. In France, where we  
130 were at a considerable disadvantage and lost many machines on the ground when they were standing round  
131 the aerodromes, we were accustomed to inflict in the air losses of as much as two and two-and-a-half to one.  
132 In the fighting over Dunkirk, which was a sort of no-man's-land, we undoubtedly beat the German Air Force,  
133 and gained the mastery of the local air, inflicting here a loss of three or four to one day after day. Anyone who  
134 looks at the photographs which were published a week or so ago of the re-embarkation, showing the masses  
135 of troops assembled on the beach and forming an ideal target for hours at a time, must realize that this re-  
136 embarkation would not have been possible unless the enemy had resigned all hope of recovering air  
137 superiority at that time and at that place.

138 In the defense of this Island the advantages to the defenders will be much greater than they were in the  
139 fighting around Dunkirk. We hope to improve on the rate of three or four to one which was realized at  
140 Dunkirk; and in addition all our injured machines and their crews which get down safely-and, surprisingly, a  
141 very great many injured machines and men do get down safely in modern air fighting-all of these will fall, in  
142 an attack upon these Islands, on friendly soil and live to fight another day; whereas all the injured enemy  
143 machines and their complements will be total losses as far as the war is concerned.

144 During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and continuous aid to the French Army, both by  
145 fighters and bombers; but in spite of every kind of pressure we never would allow the entire metropolitan  
146 fighter strength of the Air Force to be consumed. This decision was painful, but it was also right, because the  
147 fortunes of the battle in France could not have been decisively affected even if we had thrown in our entire  
148 fighter force. That battle was lost by the unfortunate strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforeseen  
149 power of the armored columns, and by the great preponderance of the German Army in numbers. Our fighter  
150 Air Force might easily have been exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle, and then we should have  
151 found ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight. But as it is, I am happy to inform the House that  
152 our fighter strength is stronger at the present time relatively to the Germans, who have suffered terrible  
153 losses, than it has ever been; and consequently we believe ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue the  
154 war in the air under better conditions than we have ever experienced before. I look forward confidently to the  
155 exploits of our fighter pilots-these splendid men, this brilliant youth-who will have the glory of saving their  
156 native land, their island home, and all they love, from the most deadly of all attacks.

157 There remains, of course, the danger of bombing attacks, which will certainly be made very soon upon us by  
158 the bomber forces of the enemy. It is true that the German bomber force is superior in numbers to ours; but  
159 we have a very large bomber force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets in Germany without  
160 intermission. I do not at all underrate the severity of the ordeal which lies before us; but I believe our  
161 countrymen will show themselves capable of standing up to it, like the brave men of Barcelona, and will be  
162 able to stand up to it, and carry on in spite of it, at least as well as any other people in the world. Much will  
163 depend upon this; every man and every woman will have the chance to show the finest qualities of their race,  
164 and render the highest service to their cause. For all of us, at this time, whatever our sphere, our station, our  
165 occupation or our duties, it will be a help to remember the famous lines:

166 "He nothing common did or mean,  
167 Upon that memorable scene."

168 I have thought it right upon this occasion to give the House and the country some indication of the solid,  
169 practical grounds upon which we base our inflexible resolve to continue the war. There are a good many  
170 people who say, "Never mind. Win or lose, sink or swim, better die than submit to tyranny-and such a  
171 tyranny." And I do not dissociate myself from them. But I can assure them that our professional advisers of  
172 the three Services unitedly advise that we should carry on the war, and that there are good and reasonable  
173 hopes of final victory. We have fully informed and consulted all the self-governing Dominions, these great  
174 communities far beyond the oceans who have been built up on our laws and on our civilization, and who are  
175 absolutely free to choose their course, but are absolutely devoted to the ancient Motherland, and who feel  
176 themselves inspired by the same emotions which lead me to stake our all upon duty and honor. We have fully  
177 consulted them, and I have received from their Prime Ministers, Mr. Mackenzie King of Canada, Mr. Menzies of  
178 Australia, Mr. Fraser of New Zealand, and General Smuts of South Africa-that wonderful man, with his  
179 immense profound mind, and his eye watching from a distance the whole panorama of European affairs-I  
180 have received from all these eminent men, who all have Governments behind them elected on wide  
181 franchises, who are all there because they represent the will of their people, messages couched in the most  
182 moving terms in which they endorse our decision to fight on, and declare themselves ready to share our  
183 fortunes and to persevere to the end. That is what we are going to do.

184 We may now ask ourselves: In what way has our position worsened since the beginning of the war? It has  
185 worsened by the fact that the Germans have conquered a large part of the coastline of Western Europe, and  
186 many small countries have been overrun by them. This aggravates the possibilities of air attack and adds to  
187 our naval preoccupations. It in no way diminishes, but on the contrary definitely increases, the power of our  
188 long-distance blockade. Similarly, the entrance of Italy into the war increases the power of our long-distance  
189 blockade. We have stopped the worst leak by that. We do not know whether military resistance will come to  
190 an end in France or not, but should it do so, then of course the Germans will be able to concentrate their  
191 forces, both military and industrial, upon us. But for the reasons I have given to the House these will not be  
192 found so easy to apply. If invasion has become more imminent, as no doubt it has, we, being relieved from the  
193 task of maintaining a large army in France, have far larger and more efficient forces to meet it.

194 If Hitler can bring under his despotic control the industries of the countries he has conquered, this will add  
195 greatly to his already vast armament output. On the other hand, this will not happen immediately, and we are  
196 now assured of immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all kinds from the  
197 United States; and especially of aeroplanes and pilots from the Dominions and across the oceans coming from  
198 regions which are beyond the reach of enemy bombers.

199 I do not see how any of these factors can operate to our detriment on balance before the winter comes; and  
200 the winter will impose a strain upon the Nazi regime, with almost all Europe writhing and starving under its  
201 cruel heel, which, for all their ruthlessness, will run them very hard. We must not forget that from the  
202 moment when we declared war on the 3rd September it was always possible for Germany to turn all her Air  
203 Force upon this country, together with any other devices of invasion she might conceive, and that France  
204 could have done little or nothing to prevent her doing so. We have, therefore, lived under this danger, in  
205 principle and in a slightly modified form, during all these months. In the meanwhile, however, we have  
206 enormously improved our methods of defense, and we have learned what we had no right to assume at the  
207 beginning, namely, that the individual aircraft and the individual British pilot have a sure and definite  
208 superiority. Therefore, in casting up this dread balance sheet and contemplating our dangers with a  
209 disillusioned eye, I see great reason for intense vigilance and exertion, but none whatever for panic or  
210 despair.

211 During the first four years of the last war the Allies experienced nothing but disaster and disappointment.  
212 That was our constant fear: one blow after another, terrible losses, frightful dangers. Everything miscarried.  
213 And yet at the end of those four years the morale of the Allies was higher than that of the Germans, who had  
214 moved from one aggressive triumph to another, and who stood everywhere triumphant invaders of the lands  
215 into which they had broken. During that war we repeatedly asked ourselves the question: How are we going  
216 to win? and no one was able ever to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite  
217 unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we were so gladdened with victory that in our folly we  
218 threw it away.

219 We do not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French resistance will be prolonged, both in  
220 France and in the French Empire overseas. The French Government will be throwing away great  
221 opportunities and casting adrift their future if they do not continue the war in accordance with their Treaty  
222 obligations, from which we have not felt able to release them. The House will have read the historic  
223 declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own hearts-we have proclaimed our  
224 willingness at the darkest hour in French history to conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle.  
225 However matters may go in France or with the French Government, or other French Governments, we in this  
226 Island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the French people. If we are  
227 now called upon to endure what they have been suffering, we shall emulate their courage, and if final victory  
228 rewards our toils they shall share the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all. We abate nothing of our  
229 just demands; not one jot or tittle do we recede. Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians have joined their  
230 causes to our own. All these shall be restored.

231 What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin.  
232 Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the  
233 long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be  
234 turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to  
235 him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we  
236 fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will  
237 sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of  
238 perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British  
239 Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, "This was their finest hour."

# Week #6 Roundtable Discussion

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## Wichelns (24)

Rhetorical criticism assesses the effectiveness of an orator's persuasion on the particular audience

1. How do we see the message is shaped to engage the audience of the British people at large?
2. How is it also worked to fit a larger global audience?

## Parrish (39-40)

Rhetorical criticism looks to qualified critics for their analysis of an orator's quality

3. Who is qualified to evaluate the effectiveness of this speech?
4. Who has 'wide education,' 'exposure to speeches,' 'familiarity with treatises on rhetoric?'"

## Wrage (28)

Ideas have social utility; a people's values are expressed in the speeches of its orators.

5. What can we learn of this people's value system, their beliefs, and their understanding of national identity?

## Leff & Mohrmann (166)

Lincoln's speech calls on a higher authority, uses *prosopopoeia* by addressing multiple audiences, and effectively employs *argumentum ad hominem*.

6. Do you find Churchill's approach similar or dissimilar to Lincoln's?
7. Does this examination of text remind anyone else of Gula? ☺

## Black (56)

Black seems to argue for and against neo-aristotelian (neo-classical, systematic, categorizing) criticism.

8. Do you agree with Black's argument and find that the neo-aristotelian approach is helpful in its "historical" evaluation of Churchill?
9. Do you agree that it fails in the "re-creative" and "judicial" functions as he illustrates with the 'Coatesvill Address' example?